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Abstract- Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a wireless system that comprises mobile nodes. It 
is usually referred to a decentralized autonomous system. Self configurability and easy 
deployment feature of the MANET resulted in numerous applications in this modern era. Its 
routing protocol has to be able to cope with the new challenges that a MANET creates such as 
nodes mobility, security maintenance, and quality of service, limited bandwidth and limited power 
supply. These challenges set  new demands on MANET routing protocols. With the increasing 
interest in MANETs, there has been a greater focus on the subject of securing such networks. 
However, the majority of these MANET secure routing protocols did not provide a complete 
solution for  all the MANETs’ attacks and assumed that any node participating in the MANET is 
not selfish and that it will cooperate to support different network functionalities. My thesis strategy 
is to choose one of the secure routing protocols According to its security-effectiveness, study it 
and analyze its functionality and performance. The authenticated routing for ad hoc networks 
(ARAN) secure routing protocol was chosen for analysis. Then, the different existing cooperation 
enforcement schemes were surveyed so that to come up with a reputation-based scheme to 
integrate with the ARAN protocol. The result of that integration is called: Trustful-ARAN. 
Consequently, the ARAN is capable of handling both selfish and malicious nodes’ attacks. The 
improvement is obtained at the cost of a higher overhead percentage with minimal increase in 
the average number of hops. The Trustful-ARAN proves to be more efficient and more secure 
than normal ARAN secure routing protocol in defending against both malicious and 
authenticated selfish nodes.  
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Abstract- Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET) is a wireless 
system that comprises mobile nodes. It is usually referred to a 
decentralized autonomous system. Self configurability and 
easy deployment feature of the MANET resulted in numerous 
applications in this modern era. Its routing protocol has to be 
able to cope with the new challenges that a MANET creates 
such as nodes mobility, security maintenance, and quality of 
service, limited bandwidth and limited power supply. These 
challenges set new demands on MANET routing protocols. 
With the increasing interest in MANETs, there has been a 
greater focus on the subject of securing such networks. 
However, the majority of these MANET secure routing 
protocols did not provide a complete solution for all the 
MANETs’ attacks and assumed that any node participating in 
the MANET is not selfish and that it will cooperate to support 
different network functionalities. My thesis strategy is to 
choose one of the secure routing protocols according to its 
security-effectiveness, study it and analyze its functionality and 
performance. The authenticated routing for ad hoc networks 
(ARAN) secure routing protocol was chosen for analysis. 
Then, the different existing cooperation enforcement schemes 
were surveyed so that to come up with a reputation-based 
scheme to integrate with the ARAN protocol. The result of that 
integration is called: Trustful-ARAN. Consequently, the ARAN 
is capable of handling both selfish and malicious nodes’ 
attacks. The improvement is obtained at the cost of a higher 
overhead percentage with minimal increase in the average 
number of hops. The Trustful-ARAN proves to be more 
efficient and more secure than normal ARAN secure routing 
protocol in defending against both malicious and 
authenticated selfish nodes. 
Keywords- MANET, ARAN, Routing Protocols. 
I. Introduction  
ireless networking is an emerging technology 
that allows users to access information and 
services electronically, regardless of their 
geographic position.  
The use of wireless communication between 
mobile users has become increasingly popular due to 
recent performance advancements in computer and 
wireless technologies. This has led to lower prices and 
higher data rates, which are the two main reasons why 
mobile computing is expected to see increasingly 
widespread use and applications. There are two distinct 
approaches for enabling wireless communications 
between mobile hosts. The first approach is to use a 
fixed network infrastructure that provides wireless 
access points. In this network, a mobile host 
communicates with the network through an access  
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point within its communication radius. When it goes out 
of range of one access point, it connects with a new 
access point within its range and starts communicating 
through it. An example of this type of network is the 
cellular network infrastructure. A major problem of this 
approach is handoff, which tries to handle the situation 
when a connection should be smoothly handed over 
from one access point to another access point without 
noticeable delay or packet loss. Another issue is that 
networks based on a fixed infrastructure are limited to 
places where there exist such network infrastructures [1] 
and [4].  
The second approach which is the focus of this 
thesis research is to form a wireless ad hoc network 
among users wanting to communicate with each other 
with no pre-established infrastructure. Laptops and 
personal digital assistants (PDAs) that communicate 
directly with each other are examples of nodes in an ad 
hoc network. Nodes in the ad-hoc network are often 
mobile, but can also consist of stationary nodes. Each 
of the nodes has a wireless interface and 
communicates with others over either radio or infrared 
channels. 
Wireless ad-hoc networks can be deployed in 
areas where a wired network infrastructure may be 
undesirable due to reasons such as cost or 
convenience. It can be rapidly deployed to support 
emergency requirements, short-term needs, and 
coverage in undeveloped areas. So there is a plethora 
of applications for wireless ad-hoc networks. As a 
matter of fact, any day-to-day application such as 
electronic email and file transfer can be considered to 
be easily deployable within an ad hoc network 
environment. Also, we need not emphasize the wide 
range of military applications possible with ad hoc 
networks. Not to mention, the technology was initially 
developed keeping in mind the military applications, 
such as battlefield in an unknown territory where an 
infrastructure network is almost impossible to have or 
maintain. In such situations, the ad hoc networks having 
self-organizing capability can be effectively used where 
other technologies either fail or cannot be deployed 
effectively.  
In the field of mobile ad hoc networks routing 
protocols, there are lot of problems to be tackled such 
as Quality of service, power awareness, routing 
optimization and security issues. In this thesis, the main 
interest is in the security issues related to routing 
protocols in MANETs. So, I started researching by 
reading about the different research directions in this 
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huge field and analyzed the different existing routing 
protocols and their various types. I ended up interested 
in the AODV protocol and studied its source code. Then 
more interest in secure routing protocols and their 
different mechanism in defending against the malicious, 
compromised and selfish nodes in the mobile ad hoc 
network were developed. Existing secure routing 
protocols were studied such as ARAN, SAODV, SRP 
and others. Then, the decision to work with the ARAN 
protocol was taken after having read many papers 
about it, getting in contact with its author and doing 
some comparisons and analysis with other secure 
routing protocols. The ARAN protocol was observed to 
defend almost against all security attacks in MANETs. 
However, by doing more research in the field of 
MANETs, one major flaw in any of the existing secure 
routing protocols was discovered. This is that all of 
these secure routing protocols do not account for 
selfish nodes whether by detecting or isolating them 
from the network. So I decided to read about the 
different types of cooperation enforcement schemes in 
mobile ad hoc networks and then to design and 
integrate a reputation-based scheme with the ARAN 
routing protocol to end up with Reputed-ARAN that is 
capable of defending itself against both malicious and 
authenticated selfish nodes [2] and [3]. 
II. Background 
Security in MANET is an essential component 
for basic network functionalities like packet forwarding 
and routing. Network operation can be easily 
jeopardized if security countermeasures are not 
embedded into basic network functions at the early 
stages of their design. In mobile ad hoc networks, 
network basic functions like packet forwarding, routing 
and network management are performed by all nodes 
instead of dedicated ones. In fact, the security problems 
specific to a mobile ad hoc network can be traced back 
to this very difference. Instead of using dedicated nodes 
for the execution of critical network functions, one has to 
find other ways to solve this because the nodes of a 
mobile ad hoc network cannot be trusted in this way. In 
the following section, the different types of attacks in 
MANETs will be presented.  
• Attacks targeting Routing Protocols  
There are basically two types of security threats 
to a routing protocol, external and internal attackers. An 
external attacker can be in the form of an adversary who 
injects erroneous information into the network and 
cause the routing to stop functioning properly. The 
internal attacker is a node that has been compromised, 
which might feed other nodes with incorrect information.  
• Malicious and Selfish Nodes in MANETs  
Malicious nodes can disrupt the correct 
functioning of a routing protocol by modifying routing 
information, by fabricating false routing information and 
by impersonating other nodes. On the other side, selfish 
nodes can severely degrade network performances and 
eventually partition the network by simply not 
participating in the network operation. 
In existing ad hoc routing protocols, nodes are 
trusted in that they do not maliciously tamper with the 
content of protocol messages transferred among 
nodes. Malicious nodes can easily perpetrate integrity 
attacks by simply altering protocol fields in order to 
subvert traffic, deny communication to legitimate nodes 
(denial of service) and compromise the integrity of 
routing computations in general. As a result the attacker 
can cause network traffic to be dropped, redirected to a 
different destination or to take a longer route to the 
destination increasing communication delays [2] and 
[5]. 
A more subtle type of active attack is the 
creation of a tunnel (or wormhole) in the network 
between two colluding malicious nodes linked through a 
private connection bypassing the network. This exploit 
allows a node to short-circuit the normal flow of routing 
messages creating a virtual vertex cut in the network 
that is controlled by the two colluding attackers. 
In the figure 1, M1 and M2 are malicious nodes 
collaborating to misrepresent available path lengths by 
tunneling route request packets. Solid lines denote 
actual paths between nodes, the thin line denotes the 
tunnel, and the dotted line denotes the path that M1 and 
M2 falsely claim is between them. Let us say that node 
S wishes to form a route to D and initiates route 
discovery. 
 
Figure 1 Wormhole Attack 
When M1 receives a RDP from S, M1 
encapsulates the RDP and tunnels it to M2 through an 
existing data route, in this case {M1ABCM2}. 
When M2 receives the encapsulated RDP, it forwards 
the RDP on to D as if it had only traveled 
{SM1M2D}. Neither M1 nor M2 update the 
packet header to reflect that the RDP also traveled the 
path {ABC}. After route discovery, it appears to the 
destination that there are two routes from S of unequal 
length: {SABCD} and {SM1M2D}. If M2 
tunnels the RREP back to M1, S would falsely consider 
the path to D via M1 a better choice (in terms of path 
length) than the path to D via A. Another exposure of 
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current ad hoc routing protocols is due to node 
selfishness that results in lack of cooperation among ad 
hoc nodes. A selfish node that wants to save battery life, 
CPU cycles and bandwidth for its own communication 
can endanger the correct network operation by simply 
not participating in the routing protocol or by not 
forwarding packets and dropping them whether control 
or data packets. This type of attack is called the black-
hole attack. Current Ad Hoc routing protocols do not 
address the selfishness problem and assumes that all 
nodes in the MANET will cooperate to provide the 
required network functionalities. 
Routing Protocols’ Security Requirements 
To solve the security issue in an ad hoc network 
and make it secure we have to look at a number of 
requirements that have to be achieved. These 
requirements are: availability, confidentiality, integrity, 
authentication and non-repudiation.  
Availability: the network must at all times be 
available to send and receive messages despite if it is 
under attack. An attack can be in the form of a denial of 
service or an employed jamming to interfere with the 
communication. Other possible threats to the availability 
are if an attacker disrupts the routing protocol or some 
other high-level service and disconnects the network. 
The node itself can also be the problem to availability. 
This is if the node is selfish and will not provide its 
services for the benefit of other nodes in order to save 
its own resources like, battery power.  
Confidentiality: provides secrecy to sensitive 
material being sent over the network. This is especially 
important in a military scenario where strategic and 
tactical information is sent. If this information would fall 
into enemy hands it could have devastating 
ramifications.  
 Integrity: ensures that messages being sent 
over the network are not corrupted. Possible attacks 
that would compromise the integrity are malicious 
attacks on the network or benign failures in the form of 
radio signal failures.  
Authentication: ensures the identity of the 
nodes in the network. If A is sending to B, A knows that 
it is B who is receiving the message. Also B knows that 
it is A who is sending the message. If the authentication 
is not working, it is possible for an outsider to 
masquerade a node and then be able to send and 
receive messages without anybody noticing it, thus 
gaining access to sensitive information.  
 Non-repudiation: makes it possible for a 
receiving node to identify another node as the origin of a 
message. The sender cannot deny having sent the 
message and are therefore responsible for its contents. 
It is particularly useful for detection of compromised 
nodes. However, because there are so many threats to 
protect from, there can not be a general solution to 
them all. Also different applications will have different 
security requirements to take into consideration. As a 
result of this diversity, many different approaches have 
been made which focus on different parts of the 
problems. In the coming section, a comparison of some 
of the existing secure mobile ad hoc routing protocols 
with respect to most of the fundamental performance 
parameters will be given [1] and [4] and [6].  
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks Protocol 
(ARAN) 
One of the secure mobile ad hoc networks 
protocols, which is Authenticated routing for ad hoc 
networks (ARAN) is analyzed. Such protocol is classified 
as a secure reactive routing protocol, which is based on 
some type of query-reply dialog. That means ARAN 
does not attempt to continuously maintain the up-to-
date topology of the network, but rather when there is a 
need, it invokes a function to find a route to the 
destination. In the following subsections, the details of 
the different phases of the ARAN secure routing 
protocol are presented. Furthermore, appendix B 
presents documentation for all the functions of ARAN 
secure mobile ad hoc network routing protocol.  
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks 
The ARAN secure routing protocol proposed in 
recent and uses cryptographic certificates to prevent 
and detect most of the security attacks that most of the 
ad hoc routing protocols face. This protocol introduces 
authentication, message integrity and non-repudiation 
as part of a minimal security policy for the ad hoc 
environment.  
ARAN consists of a preliminary certification 
process followed by a route instantiation process that 
guarantees end-to-end authentication. Thus, the routing 
messages are authenticated end-to-end and only 
authorized nodes participate at each hop between 
source and destination.  
Route Maintenance  
When no traffic has occurred on an existing 
route for that route’s lifetime, the route is simply 
deactivated in the routing table. Data received on an 
inactive route causes nodes to generate a Route Error 
(RERR) message. Also, nodes use RERR messages to 
report links in active routes that are broken due to node 
movement. Of course, all RERR messages are signed. 
On the other hand, it is extremely difficult to 
detect when RERR messages are fabricated for links 
that are truly active and not broken. That is why having 
messages signed prevents impersonation and enables 
non-repudiation. So a node that transmits a large 
number of RERR messages, whether the RERR 
messages are valid or fabricated should be avoided.  
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Key Revocation  
In the event that a certificate needs to be 
revoked, the trusted certificate server, T, sends a 
broadcast message to the ad hoc network announcing 
the revoked node. And any node receiving this message 
rebroadcasts it to its neighbors. Moreover, revocation-
notices need to be stored until the revoked certificate 
expire normally [7] and [8]. 
 
Figure 2: Route Maintenance 
Malicious attacks defended by ARAN  
An analysis of the robustness of the 
Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks in the 
presence of the different attacks introduced in earlier 
sections is given:  
 Unauthorized participation: Since all ARAN packets 
must be signed, a node cannot participate in routing 
without authorization from the trusted certificate server. 
This access control therefore rests in the security of the 
trusted authority, the authorization mechanisms 
employed by the trusted authority, the strength of the 
issued certificates, and the revocation mechanism.  
Spoofed Route Signaling: Route discovery packets 
contain the certificate of the source node and are 
signed with the source's private key. Similarly, reply 
packets include the destination node's certificate and 
signature, ensuring that only the destination can 
respond to route discovery. This prevents impersonation 
attacks where either the source or destination node is 
spoofed.  
Fabricated Routing Messages: Since all routing 
messages must include the sending node's certificate 
and signature, ARAN ensures non-repudiation and 
prevents spoofing and unauthorized participation in 
routing.  
 Alteration of Routing Messages: ARAN specifies that 
all fields of RDP and RREP packets remain unchanged 
between source and destination. Since both packet 
types are signed by the initiating node, any alterations in 
transit would be detected, and the altered packet would 
be subsequently discarded. Thus, modification attacks 
are prevented in ARAN.  
Denial-of-Service Attacks: Denial-of-service 
(DoS) attacks can be conducted by nodes with or 
without valid ARAN certificates. In the certificate-less 
case, all possible attacks are limited to the attacker's 
immediate neighbors because unsigned route requests 
are dropped. However, nodes with valid certificates can 
conduct effective DoS attacks by sending many 
unnecessary route requests and they will go undetected 
as the current existing ARAN protocol cannot 
differentiate between legitimate and malicious RREQs 
coming from authenticated nodes.  
Attack ARAN 
Remote Redirection NO 
Modification of hop counts NO 
Modification of source 
routs 
NO 
Tunneling YES, but only to length 
path 
Spoofing -------- 
Fabrication -------- 
Fabrication of error 
message 
YES, but non-repudiable 
Fabrication of source routs NO 
ARAN and Selfish node weakness  
It is clear from the above mentioned security 
analysis of the ARAN protocol that ARAN is a secure 
MANET routing protocol providing authentication, 
message integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation 
by using certificates infrastructure. As a consequence, 
ARAN is capable of defending itself against spoofing, 
fabrication, modification, DoS and disclosure attacks. 
However, erratic behavior can come from a malicious 
node, which will be defended against successfully by 
existing ARAN protocol, and can also come from an 
authenticated node. The currently existing ARAN secure 
routing protocol does not account for attacks that are 
conducted by authenticated selfish nodes as these 
nodes trust each other to cooperate in providing 
network functionalities. This results in that ARAN fails to 
detect and defend against an authenticated selfish 
node participating in the mobile ad hoc network. Thus, if 
an authenticated selfish node does not forward or 
intentionally drop control or data packets, the current 
specification of ARAN routing protocol cannot detect or 
defend against such authenticated selfish nodes. This 
weakness in ARAN specification will result in the 
disturbance of the ad hoc network and the waste of the 
network bandwidth. A solution is proposed to account 
for this type of attack [1] and [2] and [4] and [7].
 
Proposed Technique 
Performance of Mobile Ad Hoc Networks is well 
known to suffer from free-riding, selfish nodes, as there 
is a natural incentive for nodes to only consume, but not 
contribute to the services of the system.  The definition 
of selfish behavior and the newly designed reputation-
based scheme, to be integrated with normal ARAN 
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routing protocol ending up having Reputed-ARAN, are 
presented. 
Main Idea of the Reputation System  
In the proposed reputation scheme, all the 
nodes in the mobile ad hoc network will be assigned an 
initial value of null (0) as in the Ocean reputation-based 
scheme. Also, the functionality of the normal ARAN 
routing protocol in the authenticated route setup phase 
will be modified so that instead of the destination 
unicasts a RREP to the first received RDP packet of a 
specific sender only, the destination will unicast a RREP 
for each RDP packet it receives and forward this RREP 
on the reverse-path. The next-hop node will relay this 
RREP. This process continues until the RREP reaches 
the sender. After that, the source node sends the data 
packet to the node with the highest reputation. Then the 
intermediate node forwards the data packet to the next 
hop with the highest reputation and the process is 
repeated till the packet reaches its destination. The 
destination acknowledges the data packet (DACK) to 
the source that updates its reputation table by giving a 
recommendation of (+1) to the first hop of the reverse 
path. All the intermediate nodes in the route give a 
recommendation of (+1) to their respective next hop in 
the route and update their local reputation tables. If 
there is a selfish node in the route, the data packet does 
not reach its destination. As a result, the source does 
not receive any DACK for the data packet in appropriate 
time. So, the source gives a recommendation of (-2) to 
the first hop on the route. The intermediate nodes also 
give a recommendation (-2) to their next hop in the route 
up to the node that dropped the packet. As a 
consequence, all the nodes between the selfish node 
and the sender, including the selfish node, get a 
recommendation of (-2). The idea of giving (-2) to selfish 
nodes per each data packet dropping is due to the fact 
that negative behavior should be given greater weight 
than positive behavior. In addition, this way prevents a 
selfish node from dropping alternate packets in order to 
keep 
its reputation constant. This makes it more 
difficult for a selfish node to build up a good reputation 
to attack for a sustained period of time. Moreover, the 
selfish node will be isolated if its reputation reached a 
threshold of (-40) as in the Ocean reputation-based 
scheme.  
The proposed protocol is structured into the 
following four main phases, which are explained in the 
subsequent subsections:  
• Route Lookup Phase  
• Data Transfer Phase  
• Reputation Phase  
• Timeout Phase  
 
 
Route Lookup Phase 
This phase mainly incorporates the 
authenticated route discovery and route setup phases 
of the normal ARAN secure routing protocol. In this 
phase, if a source node S has packets for the 
destination node D, the source node broadcasts a route 
discovery packet (RDP) for a route from node S to node 
D. Each intermediate node interested in cooperating to 
route this control packet broadcasts it throughout the 
mobile ad hoc network; in addition, each intermediate 
node inserts a record of the source, nonce, destination 
and previous-hop of this packet in its routing records. 
This process continues until this RDP packet reaches 
the destination. Then the destination unicasts a route 
reply packet (RREP) for each RDP packet it receives 
back using the reverse-path. Each intermediate node 
receiving this RREP updates its routing table for the 
next-hop of the route reply packet and then unicasts this 
RREP in the reverse-path using the earlier-stored 
previous-hop node information. This process repeats 
until the RREP packet reaches the source node S. 
Finally, the source node S inserts a record for the 
destination node D in its routing table for each received 
RREP. In the below figures, the route lookup phase is 
presented in details, illustrating the two phases of it, the 
authenticated route discovery phase and the 
authenticated route setup phase. 
 
Figure 3: A MANET Environment 
 
Figure 4: Broadcasting RDP 
 
Figure 5: Replying to each RDP 
Data Transfer Phase  
At this time, the source node S and the other 
intermediate nodes have many RREPs for the same 
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RDP packet sent earlier. So, the source node S chooses 
the highly-reputed next-hop node for its data transfer. If 
two next-hop nodes have the same reputation, S will 
choose one of them randomly, stores its information in 
the sent-table as the path for its data transfer. Also, the 
source node will start a timer before it should receive a 
data acknowledgement (DACK) from the destination for 
this data packet. Afterwards, the chosen next-hop node 
will again choose the highly-reputed next-hop node 
from its routing table and will store its information in its 
sent-table as the path of this data transfer. Also, this 
chosen node will start a timer, before which it should 
receive the DACK from the destination for this data 
packet. This process continues till the data packet 
reaches the destination node D. And of course in this 
phase, if the data packet has originated from a low-
reputed node, the packet is put back at the end of the 
queue of the current node. If the packet has originated 
from a high-reputed node, the current node sends the 
data packet to the next highly-reputed hop in the route 
discovered in the previous phase as soon as possible. 
Once the packet reaches its destination, the destination 
node D sends a signed data acknowledgement packet 
to the source S. The DACK traverses the same route as 
the data packet, but in the reverse direction. In the 
following figures, the data transfer phase is illustrated: 
 
Figure 6: Choosing the highly-reputed next-hop node 
 
Figure 7: Sending Data Acknowledgement for each 
received data packet 
Reputation Phase  
In this phase, when an intermediate node 
receives a data acknowledgement packet (DACK), it 
retrieves the record, inserted in the data transfer phase, 
corresponding to this data packet then it increments the 
reputation of the next hop node. In addition, it deletes 
this data packet entry from its sent-table. Once the 
DACK packet reaches node S, it deletes this entry from 
its sent-table and gives a recommendation of (+1) to 
the node that delivered the acknowledgement. 
 Timeout Phase 
 In this phase, once the timer for a given data 
packet expires at a node; the node retrieves the entry 
corresponding to this data transfer operation returned 
by the timer from its sent-table. Then, the node gives a 
negative recommendation (-2) to the next-hop node and 
deletes the entry from the sent-table. Later on, when the 
intermediate nodes’ timers up to the node that dropped 
the packet expire, they give a negative recommendation 
to their next hop node and delete the entry from their 
sent-table. As a consequence, all the nodes between 
the selfish node and the sender, including the selfish 
node, get a recommendation of (-2). Now, if the 
reputation of the
 
next-hop node goes below the 
threshold (-40), the current node deactivates this node 
in its routing table and sends an error message RERR to 
the upstream nodes in the route. Then the original 
ARAN protocol handles it. Now, it is the responsibility of 
the sender to reinitiate the route discovery again. In 
addition, the node whose reputation value reached (-40) 
is now temporally weeded out of the MANET for five 
minutes and it later joins the network with a value of (0) 
so that to treat it as a newly joined node in the network.
 Analysis of the proposed Reputed-ARAN 
 An analysis of the proposed reputation-based 
scheme is given by discussing different authenticated 
selfish nodes’ forms of attacks and presenting ways of 
counteracting them by the introduced reputation-based 
scheme. 
 
 
An authenticated selfish node might make a false 
claim of knowing the route to a destination and generate 
a RREP for a destination for which it does not have a 
route. This attack can be foiled by the proposed 
reputation-based scheme routing. After receiving the 
data packet for the corresponding destination, this 
authenticated selfish node will have to drop the data 
packet. The sender and the intermediate nodes until this 
selfish node will give a negative recommendation to it. 
Thus, once the reputation of this selfish node falls below 
the threshold reputation, it will be considered as selfish 
and will eventually be temporary ostracized. 
 An authenticated selfish node might not reveal that it 
knows the route to the destination by not replying to or 
forwarding control packets so that to save its resources, 
such as energy and processing power; by doing this 
selfish behavior, it will not be able to inflict any damage 
to the network as it will not be able to drop the data 
packets routed via other paths. To face this type of 
selfish attack, the proposed scheme considers the 
reputation value of the node asking others to forward its 
packets. If the packet has originated from a low-reputed 
node, the packet is assigned lowermost priority and if 
the
 
packet has originated from a high-reputed node, the 
current node sends the data packet to the next hop in 
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the route as soon as possible. Hence, these selfish 
nodes will see a considerable increase in network 
latency. So, the proposed scheme helps in encouraging 
the nodes to participate and cooperate in the ad hoc 
network effectively.  
 An authenticated selfish node might promise to route 
data packets, but then it starts to drop all the data 
packets that it receives. The presented reputation-
based scheme foils this attack. In such a scenario, the 
upstream neighbor of the node will give it a negative 
recommendation and the reputation of the node will be 
reduced. Eventually, the node will be weeded out of the 
network for a period of time.  
Authenticated selfish nodes might collude by giving 
positive recommendations to each other so that to 
increase their reputations. The proposed reputation-
based scheme prevents this attack by having the nodes 
rely on their own experience rather than the experience 
of their peers. Although the exchange of reputation 
information among the nodes will make the system 
more robust, it is not incorporated in my scheme. This is 
due to that if the nodes exchange the reputations of 
other nodes, the target (node soliciting reputation of 
another node) will have to consider the credibility of the 
information source (node providing reputation of 
another node). As a result, this will imply more work for 
the nodes at the routing layer and will also increase the 
volume of the network traffic. The downside of my 
scheme is that an authenticated selfish node can move 
around the network and selectively drop packets from 
different neighbors without getting caught for a long 
time. However, eventually this selfish node will be 
caught.  
An authenticated selfish node might continuously 
drops data packets to decrease the throughput of the 
mobile ad hoc network. The presented scheme can 
prevent such attack. Since the nodes in an ad hoc 
network are semi-autonomous, the proposed 
reputation-based scheme motivates them to allocate 
their resources to other nodes in the network. As the 
sender relays the packet only to highly reputed 
neighbors, it reduces the risk that its neighbors will 
intentionally drop the packet. The neighbors in turn 
forward the packets to nodes that have a high 
reputation with them. As a result, the number of packets 
intentionally dropped is reduced and the throughput of 
the system rises.  
 An authenticated well-behaved node might become 
a bottleneck since in the presented reputation-based 
scheme the node with the highest reputation is selected 
as the next hop by its neighbor. As a result, the nodes 
with higher reputations will become overloaded, while 
the other nodes become totally free. This problem is 
prevented in the proposed scheme as when 
authenticated nodes are congested and they cannot 
fulfill all control packets broadcasted in the MANET, they 
can choose not to reply to other nodes’ requests in 
order to do their own assigned load according to their 
battery, performance and congestion status. 
III. Results 
The below figure 8 shows the results of the 
network throughput of both protocols: normal ARAN 
and Reputed-ARAN (Trustful ARAN) with different node 
speed and different percentages of selfish nodes. From 
the above graph, it is clear that the lack of cooperation 
has fatal effect on the efficient work in dramatic fall in 
normal ARAN’s network throughput with increasing 
percentage of selfish nodes. 
The different curves show a network of 20 
nodes with different percentages of selfish nodes, from 
0% up to 30%, and moving at different speeds. Here are 
some points that can be observed in this graph:  
 In the case that there are no selfish nodes in 
the mobile ad hoc network, both ARAN and Reputed-
ARAN have almost identical network throughput values. 
This proves that the Reputed-ARAN protocol is as 
efficient as ARAN in delivering the packets and 
discovering routes to any destination. It can be noted 
that in both ARAN and Reputed-ARAN when the node 
movement speed rises, the network throughput 
diminishes as the network in general gets more fragile.  
 
 Effects of Selfish nodes on Network 
Throughput 
Also, as the percentage of selfish nodes 
participating in the mobile ad hoc network increase, the 
throughput decreases because these selfish nodes 
tend to drop packets that they beforehand promised to 
forward. The outcome of dropping packets affects the 
normal ARAN protocol during the full life of the MANET, 
but in case of Reputed-ARAN, it is just affected partially 
as by time the selfish node will be identified and 
weeded out of the network. The increase of throughput 
of the network in the case of using Reputed-ARAN is 
attributed to that each node uses its local table of other 
nodes’ reputation values in the selection of the next-hop 
node for establishing the data route.  Thus, the 
throughput of the network is reduced to 38.8% with 
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normal ARAN, when 30% of the nodes are selfish and 
moving at speed of 10 m/s. However, the throughput of 
the network is reduced to only 63.1% with Reputed-
ARAN, in the same circumstances. This proves that the 
Reputed g of the MANET. This graph shows the ARAN 
increases the network throughput by 38.5% over normal 
ARAN secure routing protocol.  
The below figure 9 shows the results of the 
average route acquisition delay metric of both 
protocols: normal ARAN and Reputed-ARAN with 
different percentage of selfish nodes. 
From the graph, it is clear that the newly 
proposed Reputed-ARAN protocol has an identical 
route acquisition delay as normal ARAN. This is due to 
that both protocols have the same steps for the 
discovery, setup and maintenance of the route, as no 
changes were done in these phases while designing the 
Reputed-ARAN. Also, it can be seen from the graph that 
in both protocols, the average route acquisition delay 
increases with the increase of the selfish nodes. 
 
Figure 9: Average Route Acquisition Delay 
This is due to the dropping of packets because 
of link failures and also because of the selfish behavior 
which results in reissuing a route discovery or taking a 
longer route to reach the destination. 
IV. Conclusion 
The field of MANETs is rapidly growing and 
changing. While there are still many challenges that 
need to be met, it is likely that such networks will see 
widespread use within the next few years. One of these 
challenges is security. Security of mobile ad hoc 
networks has recently gained momentum in the 
research community. Due to the open nature of ad hoc 
networks and their inherent lack of infrastructure, 
security exposures can be an impediment to basic 
network operation and countermeasures should be 
included in network functions from the early stages of 
their design. Security solutions for MANET have to cope 
with a challenging environment including scarce energy 
and computational resources and lack of persistent 
structure to rely on for building trust. To my knowledge, 
there is no previously published work on detecting and 
defending against malicious and authenticated selfish 
nodes together in the field of MANETs’ routing 
protocols, even in the proposed secure routing 
protocols. 
Throughout this thesis, discussion of existing 
mobile ad hoc networks' routing protocols’ types and 
their advantages and disadvantages was given and a 
list of existing proactive, reactive and secure MANET 
routing protocols was compiled. Then, the different 
types of attacks targeting MANET routing protocols’ 
security were explored. Also, the difference between 
malicious and selfish nodes and their associated 
attacks were discussed and a presentation of the 
fundamental requirements for the design of a secure 
routing protocol to defend against these security 
breaches was given. Furthermore, a comparison 
between some the existing secure mobile ad hoc 
routing protocols was presented. Then, an in-depth talk 
about the Authenticated Routing for Ad Hoc Networks 
protocol (ARAN) as one of the secure routing protocols 
built following the fundamental secure routing protocols 
design methodology was given. Afterwards, a 
discussion of how ARAN defends against most of the 
attacks that are conducted by malicious nodes such as 
spoofing, fabrication, modification and disclosure ones 
was presented. That resulted in proving that the 
currently existing specification of the ARAN secure 
routing MANET protocol does not defend against 
attacks performed by authenticated selfish nodes. Thus, 
I moved on discussing the different existing MANET 
cooperation enforcement schemes by stating their 
types: the virtual currency-based and the reputation-
based schemes. Examples of each scheme and the 
different issues involved in the design of each were 
given. That resulted in proposing a new design of a 
reputation-based scheme to integrate it with one of the 
secure routing MANET protocols, ARAN, to make it 
detect and defend against selfish nodes and their 
misbehavior. In this proposal, the different phases of the 
proposed reputation-based scheme were explained. 
Then, an analysis of the various forms of selfish attacks 
that the proposed reputation-based scheme defends 
against was presented. Also, some time was invested in 
surveying the different simulation packages that are 
used in mobile ad hoc networks. Thus, the proposed 
design proves to be more efficient and more secure 
than normal ARAN secure routing protocol in defending 
against both malicious and authenticated selfish nodes. 
References Références Referencias 
1. R.PushpaLakshmi and Dr.A.Vincent Antony 
Kumar, “Security aware Minimized Dominating 
Set based Routing in MANET”, IEEE 2010 
Second International conference on 
Computing, Communication and Networking 
Technologies. 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
  
  
V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
V
II
I 
V
er
si
on
 I
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
20
11
24
M
a
y
©2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
A Trustful Routing Protocol for Ad-hoc Network  
 
 
2. G. LAVANYA, C.KUMAR and A. REX MACEDO 
AROKIARAJ, “SECURED BACKUP ROUTING 
PROTOCOL FOR AD HOC NETWORKS’, IEEE 
2010 International Conference on Signal 
Acquisition and Processing. 
3. YongQing Ni, DaeHun Nyang and Xu Wang, “A-
Kad: an anonymous P2P protocol based on 
Kad network”, IEEE 2009. 
4. N.Bhalaji, Dr.A.Shanmugam, “ASSOCIATION 
BETWEEN NODES TO COMBAT BLACKHOLE 
ATTACK IN DSR BASED MANET”, IEEE 2009. 
5. Sohail Jabbar, Abid Ali Minhas, Raja Adeel 
Akhtar, Muhammad Zubair Aziz, “REAR: Real-
time Energy Aware Routing for Wireless Adhoc 
Micro Sensors Network”, 2009 Eighth IEEE 
International Conference on Dependable, 
Autonomic and Secure Computing. 
6. D.Suganya Devi and Dr.G.Padmavathi, 
“Performance Efficient EOMCT Algorithm for 
Secure Multicast Key Distribution for Mobile 
Adhoc Networks”, IEEE 2009 International 
Conference on Advances in Recent 
Technologies in Communication and 
Computing. 
7. Jian Ren and Yun Li and  Tongtong Li, 
“Providing Source Privacy in Mobile Ad Hoc 
Networks”, IEEE 2009. 
8. Matthew Tan Creti, Matthew Beaman, Saurabh 
Bagchi, Zhiyuan Li, and  Yung-Hsiang Lu, 
Multigrade Security Monitoring for Ad-Hoc 
Wireless Networks”, IEEE 2009. 
9. S. Zhong, J. Chen, and Y. Yang. Sprite: A 
simple, Cheat-proof, Credit-based System for 
Mobile Ad hoc Networks. Proceedings of IEEE 
Infocom, April 2003, pages 1987-1997.  
10. L. Zhou and Z. Haas. Securing Ad Hoc 
Networks. IEEE Networks Special Issue on 
Network Security. November/December 1999, 
pages 24-30. 
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
  
  
V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
V
II
I 
V
er
si
on
 I
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
20
11
25
M
a
y
©2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
G
lo
ba
l 
Jo
ur
na
l 
of
 C
om
pu
te
r 
Sc
ie
nc
e 
an
d 
T
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
  
  
V
ol
um
e 
X
I 
Is
su
e 
V
II
I 
V
er
si
on
 I
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
20
11
26
M
a
y
©2011 Global Journals Inc.  (US)
This page is intentionally left blank 
